MILLION-DOLLAR VERDICT VANISHES DUE TO LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

May 26, 2004

Steven P. Garmisa
Hoey & Farina Attorney
garmisa@hoeyfarina.com
1-888-425-1212

State courts often have concurrent jurisdiction over complaints based on federal statutes. But Congress may not force states to enlarge the subject- matter jurisdiction of local courts.

This jurisdictional wrinkle meant that a million-dollar verdict for the plaintiff in an age discrimination case -- filed under federal law in St. Clair County Circuit Court -- had to be tossed out because the Illinois Human Rights Act deprived the Circuit Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Meehan v. Illinois Power Co., 2004 WL 790290 (5th Dist, April 12).

The case contains important lessons about the subject-matter jurisdiction of Illinois courts.

Robert Meehan filed a state-court complaint accusing his former employer, Illinois Power Co., of violating the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

The jury awarded Meehan $1,041,510 in damages, and Illinois Power appealed, arguing that the Illinois Human Rights Act deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over his federal claim.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the verdict for Meehan. Here are some highlights of Justice Thomas M. Welch's opinion (with various omissions not noted in the quoted text):

"In passing the [Human Rights Act], the General Assembly intended for it to be the preemptive and exclusive vehicle for the resolution of employment discrimination cases in Illinois. Accordingly, the act itself provides, 'Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this act.' 775 ILCS 5/8-111(C).

"The Illinois Supreme Court has held that courts have no jurisdiction to hear independent actions for civil rights violations. Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill.2d 1, 7 (1985). The legislature intended by the act to avoid direct access to the courts for the redress of civil rights violations. Accordingly, the plaintiff in Mein could not bring his state-law claim of age discrimination in employment in the circuit court.

"The exclusivity of the remedy provided by the act has been broadly interpreted. Even state-law tort claims such as negligence are barred by section 8-111(C) of the act when those tort claims are grounded upon and 'inextricably linked' to an alleged civil rights violation.

"If a common-law tort action is in essence one that seeks redress for a civil rights violation as defined by the act and if there is no basis for the tort action other than the civil rights violation, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim.

"The question before us," Welch explained, "is whether this exclusivity of remedy extends to claims of civil rights violations brought under federal law, specifically the ADEA. We have previously addressed this very question and held that it does.

"In Cahoon v. Alton Packaging Corp., 148 Ill.App.3d 480 (1986), the plaintiff brought an action against his former employer under the ADEA. The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was raised, and we held, '[T]he plain language of section 8-111(C) requires that an Illinois court dismiss an ADEA case unless State administrative remedies have been exhausted.'

"We rejected the argument of the plaintiff in that case that, in passing the ADEA, Congress intended a claimant to be able to institute his action in either state court or federal court.

"Section 626(c)(1) of the ADEA provides, 'Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction.' We held that Congress did not mean to, and did not effectively, confer jurisdiction on Illinois circuit courts by virtue of this provision. A civil rights claimant may not ignore the administrative framework provided by our legislature.

"We also rejected the argument of the plaintiff in Cahoon that Illinois courts are not free to 'discriminate' against federal claims. While we agree with the principle that an Illinois court cannot treat federal claims differently than it treats similar state-law claims (see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)), neither the decision in Cahoon nor the Illinois act does so. What we held in Cahoon was that federal civil rights claims must be prosecuted under the same procedure applicable to state civil rights claims.

"Section 8-111(C) of the act requires that a civil rights claim be prosecuted in the administrative forum, and a complaint which raises a federal claim is not entitled to preferential treatment in that regard.

"The most definitive answer to the question before us is given in Faulkner- King v. Wicks, 226 Ill.App.3d 962 (1992). That case involved claims brought under federal civil rights statutes -- sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 of Title 42 of the United States Code. The plaintiff argued that Illinois circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a claim premised on federal civil rights statutes and that a state court is obligated to address such a claim.

"The Appellate Court held as follows: 'The U.S. Congress cannot require circuit courts to hear certain disputes. Congress can utilize state courts to enforce federal rights, but it must do so subject to all conditions which the state court imposes on other litigants.

" 'Although circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, the legislature, by authority of the state Constitution, has restricted that jurisdiction when the claim involves a controversy covered by the act. Courts have consistently ruled the act is the exclusive source of a remedy for an employment discrimination claim. Circuit courts cannot be compelled to accept such cases under the guise of federal authority.'

"Cooper v. Illinois State University, 331 Ill.App.3d 1094 (2002), also involved a civil action brought in Illinois circuit court for age discrimination under the federal ADEA.

"The Appellate Court held as follows: 'We adhere to Faulkner-King and Cahoon and thus hold that in Illinois, the act is the exclusive source of a remedy for employment discrimination claims.'

"Every reported decision by Illinois courts that we could find which discusses the question of a circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction over claims of civil rights violations holds consistently with the above-cited cases," Welch recounted. "We note that the plaintiff cites no reported decision in Illinois which supports his position that Illinois circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims of civil rights violations under the federal ADEA."

Welch continued with an instructive analysis of "why we continue to believe that Cahoon and Faulkner-King were correctly decided.

"The ADEA provides as follows with respect to jurisdiction, 'Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter.'

"In the absence of an express restriction in a federal statute, federal and state courts do have presumptive concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of action. State courts have inherent authority and are presumptively competent to adjudicate claims arising under federal law. Thus, under the ADEA, any state 'court of competent jurisdiction' has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to hear claims under the ADEA.

"A state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of a valid excuse. However, the requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that the state create a court of competent jurisdiction to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented.

"The general rule is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them. The states thus have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts. In addition, states may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are preempted by federal law.

"A state court may not refuse to enforce a federal right solely because the suit is brought under federal law or because the federal law is not in accord with the policy of the state, if the state court's jurisdiction is otherwise appropriate to the occasion. Thus a state court could not refuse to hear a case brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act simply because the federal act was not in accord with the policy of the state and it was inconvenient and confusing to apply federal law, where the state court's jurisdiction, as prescribed by state law, was adequate to the occasion. The existence of the jurisdiction created an implication of a duty to exercise it.

"Similarly, in McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934), the state court refused to exercise jurisdiction over a FELA cause of action. The U.S. Supreme Court held that because the state court had general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which the one in question belonged, in cases between litigants situated like those before it, the refusal to hear the FELA action constituted discrimination against rights arising under federal law.

"Only where the refusal by a state court to hear a federal claim is based on a neutral rule of judicial administration may a state court refuse to hear the federal claim. For example, where a state court denied jurisdiction over a FELA action on the grounds that the cause of action arose outside of its territorial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that, while the state court was not free to dismiss the federal claim merely because it was a federal one, it could properly dismiss the claim where it did not construe the state jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory fashion.

"In Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378, the Supreme Court held that the State of Florida could not assert sovereign immunity with respect to section 1983 claims where it did not assert sovereign immunity with respect to similar state-law claims. Where the state had waived sovereign immunity with respect to all other claims, it could not refuse to hear a section 1983 action on the basis of sovereign immunity, where the plaintiff had complied with all state- law procedures for invoking the jurisdiction of the state court.

"Under our interpretation of the act," Welch concluded, "there is no discrimination against the federal ADEA. All cases involving age discrimination, whether based on federal law or state law, are barred from Illinois circuit courts. Thus, federal claims of age discrimination are treated identically to state claims of age discrimination.

"The circuit courts of Illinois have no jurisdiction over claims of age discrimination in employment, whether based on federal law or state law. The federal statute cannot confer such jurisdiction on Illinois courts.

"Perhaps the best explanation of our position is found in Justice [Felix] Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Therein, he explains that the U.S. Congress has no power to confer jurisdiction on a state court; only the lawmaking power of the state has the power to create and confer jurisdiction on a state court. Thus, each state of the union may establish its own judicature, distribute judicial power among the courts of its choice, and define the conditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the modes of its proceeding. The U.S. Constitution does not require a state to give jurisdiction to its courts against its will.

"All that is required of a state court is the following [according to Frankfurter]: '[T]he state courts must make no hostile discrimination against litigants who come within the [federal] act in question; they must treat litigants under the federal act as other litigants are treated; they are to act in conformity with their general principles of practice and procedure and are not to deny jurisdiction merely because the right of action arises under the act of Congress.

" '[R]ights, whether legal or equitable, acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the U.S. courts, or in the state courts, competent to decide rights of the like character and class. Whether a state court is competent to decide rights of the like character and class, whether a state court can take jurisdiction and what the incidents of the litigation should be -- all these are matters wholly within the control of the state creating the court and without the power of Congress. Congress may avail itself of state courts for the enforcement of federal rights, but it must take the state courts as it finds them, subject to all the conditions for litigation in the state courts that the state has decreed for every other litigant who seeks access to its courts.'

"The Illinois legislature has removed from the Illinois courts jurisdiction over the subject of any alleged civil rights violation. Accordingly, an Illinois court is simply not a 'court of competent jurisdiction' within the meaning of section 626(c)(1) of the ADEA. Claims under the ADEA may not be brought in an Illinois circuit court."

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