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JUDGES DEBATE APPLYING RESTATEMENT FOR CHALLENGING JUDGMENTS AS VOIDAugust 27, 2004
Steven P.
Garmisa The 2d District of the Illinois Appellate Court, delivering dueling opinions, refused to apply section 12. In re Marriage of Chrobak, 2004 WL 1443904 (2d Dist., June 24). But the objecting justice declared this ruling is inconsistent with an opinion the 2d District released last year. The traditional Illinois rule is that a void judgment can be attacked at any time. But this long-standing right would be trimmed back by section 12 of the 1982 Restatement of Judgments, in cases where a collateral attack contends a judgment is void based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. According to section 12, "When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if: "(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or "(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or "(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking the capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court's subject-matter jurisdiction." In addition to disagreeing on whether to apply section 12, the 2d District split over whether the doctrine of estoppel applies to prevent a litigant from attacking a judgment in a domestic relations case when (a) financial benefits were accepted under the prior judgment, but (b) there was no remarriage in reliance on the allegedly void divorce decree. The majority concluded that a litigant who accepts financial benefits under an allegedly void domestic relations judgment is estopped from claiming the decree is void. Disagreeing, the third judge concluded that estoppel applies in this situation only when there has been a subsequent remarriage. The case involved Agnes and Charles Chrobak, who lived in Kane County during a marriage that lasted almost 30 years. Five years after Agnes left Charles and moved to Canada, she obtained a divorce decree in British Columbia. Although Agnes and Charles signed a settlement agreement, the Canadian decree did not address maintenance or division of marital property. A few months after the decree was entered in Canada dissolving the marriage, Charles filed a petition for legal separation in Kane County. Agnes defaulted, and a judgment was entered, incorporating and approving the settlement agreement.
Among other things, the settlement agreement provided that Charles would pay Agnes $1,000 a month in maintenance. Charles moved to dismiss this collateral attack on the Kane County judgment, arguing that Agnes was estopped from objecting to the Illinois decree because she accepted financial benefits under this order.
The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss, and Agnes appealed.
Objecting on both points, the third justice concluded that Illinois should apply section 12 of the Restatement and noted that the 2d District actually did so last year. The justice also contended that remarriage is required to bar a collateral attack in divorce cases. "A judgment entered by a court that lacked subject-matter jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time and in any proceeding," Johnson noted. "When subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, it cannot be conferred by stipulation, consent or waiver. Given these well-established rules, we determine that the petitioner's waiver argument lacks merit. "Before considering the petitioner's estoppel argument, we note that the special concurrence recites the test for collaterally attacking a void judgment that was delineated in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, section 12 (1982). Our Supreme Court mentioned this test in In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill.2d 169, 176 (1998), but specifically stated that it was not adopting that test in lieu of the traditional view, which provides that void judgments may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally. "Because the Restatement has not been adopted by our Supreme Court, it is not the law and merely provides guidance. As such, we believe that the traditional view is the current law and that void judgments may be collaterally attacked." Estoppel "We now consider," Johnson continued, "whether the respondent is estopped from claiming that the trial court's order for a legal separation, which incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In general, estoppel does not apply to void orders. However, in dissolution proceedings, a party who accepts the benefits of a divorce decree may be estopped from later challenging the order even if the challenge involves a claim that the order is void because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter it. "The question then becomes whether receiving maintenance and other financial benefits of a legal separation order amounts to 'accepting benefits' as used in the estoppel rule. 'Accepting benefits' is most often applied in cases where a party remarries in reliance on a divorce decree. In those instances, the rule is frequently called 'estoppel by remarriage.' "History suggests, however, that application of this estoppel rule is not limited to situations where at least one of the parties remarries. For example, courts have concluded that 'accepting benefits' can include accepting financial benefits of a dissolution or separation order. "In fact, the court in McDonald v. Neale, 35 Ill.App.2d 140, 143-44 (1962), which is perhaps the seminal Illinois case on this estoppel rule, held that the wife was estopped from challenging the divorce decree because, not only did she remarry 11 years after the divorce, she also accepted the proceeds of the parties' settlement agreement. "Turning to the facts presented in this case, we hold that the respondent is estopped from attacking the legal separation order, which incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, because she benefited from the order.
"The special concurrence asserts that the acceptance of benefits cannot be purely financial. We disagree. Courts have recognized that the estoppel rule is a combination of estoppel and ratification. "Given the beginnings of the estoppel rule, we believe that acceptance of financial benefits alone can be used to invoke the rule. "The special concurrence stresses that the estoppel rule has rarely been invoked when neither party remarries. In making this observation, the special concurrence quotes the policy behind the rule, which provides that the rights of children to a marriage and spouses of future marriages must be protected. However, the policy also serves to protect the parties to the dissolution proceedings. Specifically, it is fundamentally and legally inconsistent for divorced parties to accept the benefits of a dissolution judgment, while later asserting the judgment granting them those benefits never existed as a matter of law. "Although spouses of future marriages and children born into a marriage are typically the subject of cases involving the estoppel rule, that does not mean that the protection afforded the parties to the marriage should be unrecognized absent a remarriage. Rather, we believe the policy speaks to precisely the situation presented in this case and serves to protect people like the petitioner, who, for five years, provided financial benefits to the respondent pursuant to a judgment that the respondent now claims is void. "When a party accepts the benefits of a dissolution judgment, that party is estopped from challenging the judgment as void even in the absence of prejudice to the other party." Special Concurrence While agreeing with the conclusion that the respondent was barred from challenging the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, Kapala contended, "I believe that we need not reach the issue of estoppel to so conclude because I find that respondent cannot collaterally attack subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, I specially concur. "The majority states that '[a] judgment entered by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time and in any proceeding.' However, the rule is different when, as in this case, a party is attempting to collaterally attack the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 342 Ill.App.3d 262, 271 (2003).
"In Hulstrom, this court, in discussing our Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill.2d 169 (1998), held: 'When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if: " '(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or " '(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking the capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court's subject matter jurisdiction.' Hulstrom, 342 Ill.App.3d at 271, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments, section 12 (1982). "In this case, respondent is attempting to attack the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction five years after the petition for legal separation was granted. Respondent's attack was a petition brought under section 2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. A petition brought under section 2-1401 is considered a separate legal proceeding, not a continuation of the old proceeding. As such, respondent is attempting to collaterally attack the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, our holding in Hulstrom would prohibit such a collateral attack unless one of the three exceptions is met. "I do not believe that any of the exceptions is applicable in this case." "Accordingly, as our holding in Hulstrom is controlling and none of the exceptions are applicable, I would hold that respondent cannot collaterally attack subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, I would not rely on estoppel to resolve this case. "I note that the majority contends that in Mitchell our Supreme Court elected not to adopt the Restatement rule enunciated in Hulstrom. I disagree. "The court in Mitchell simply stated that '[t]he parties do not ask us to adopt the rule expressed in the Restatement, however, and therefore we need not decide in this case whether to take that step.' Thus, I find that Mitchell gives no insight regarding our Supreme Court's opinion as to whether the Restatement rule should be adopted. "I believe that this court's application of the Restatement rule in Hulstrom makes the rule the law in this district. The majority provides no reasoning why we should not follow our own precedent as established in Hulstrom, but instead simply chooses to follow the traditional rule. Absent some reasoning for doing so, I decline to diverge from our precedent." Estoppel Revisited "Moreover, were I to address the estoppel issue," Kapala continued, "I would find that its application is inappropriate here. It is true that courts have used the doctrine of estoppel by remarriage to bar parties from challenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. The majority cites several cases and concludes that acceptance of benefits alone is sufficient to estop respondent from raising subject-matter jurisdiction. However, all of the cases cited by the majority, except one, involved situations in which at least one party had remarried or the doctrine was found to be inapplicable. "I believe that the doctrine of estoppel by remarriage should be limited only to those situations where at least one party has remarried. "In my opinion, the policy grounds behind the estoppel by remarriage doctrine support my conclusion. It has long been recognized that the rule of estoppel in marriage cases is founded upon the public policy of protecting the marital status and good character of innocent third persons, the legitimacy of children, and the rights and position of persons whose status has been finalized by decree of divorce. "Furthermore, in Schlam, this court discussed the policy reasons for this doctrine. Schlam, 271 Ill.App.3d at 793-94. "This court stated: 'Estoppel by remarriage serves several purposes. It protects the marital status and character of third parties who marry believing their spouse has been granted a valid and final divorce. Estoppel by remarriage also ensures a child, one or both of whose parents divorced before remarrying, has the benefit of a lawfully married mother and father. Finally, estoppel by remarriage protects the rights of other persons whose rights have been finalized by the dissolution judgment. " 'Two policies underlie these considerations. First, the rights and position of a third party dependent on the validity of a dissolution judgment should not be put in jeopardy by a motion to vacate. Second, it is fundamentally and legally inconsistent for divorced parties to accept benefits of a dissolution judgment, while later asserting the judgment granting them those benefits never existed as a matter of law.' "In other words, the importance of the institution of marriage, and all the rights and responsibilities concomitant with the institution, outweigh the importance of ensuring the integrity of judgments. I simply do not believe that there are similar policy concerns in this case where the benefits accepted did not involve remarriage but were simply financial. The jurisdiction of a court is fundamental to the court's ability to render a decision. "I do not believe that we should foreclose attacks upon void judgments simply because financial benefits of a transaction were accepted. "The majority comments that the precedent for applying estoppel when financial benefits are present is long established. I once again reiterate that in all but one of the cases cited by the majority there was a remarriage, and thus, the facts of those cases differ in a material sense from this case. "Furthermore, an award of financial benefits can easily be undone through repayment, whereas the ramifications when a remarriage is involved cannot be so easily resolved. Moreover, to the extent that the cases cited by the majority do stand for the proposition that financial benefits alone are sufficient to evoke estoppel, I disagree with such a holding. "Furthermore, while I recognize that my analysis forecloses a collateral attack in this case, the majority's reasoning forecloses collateral attacks in marriage dissolution cases where such a foreclosure is not warranted. "For example, in a case where the trial court adjudicated issues plainly beyond its jurisdiction, the reasoning I employed would allow the collateral attack, as the first exception enunciated in Hulstrom would be applicable. However, under the majority's approach, if a party accepted the financial benefits flowing from such a judgment, he would be estopped from challenging the judgment. "In a nutshell, the majority's approach would let stand the judgment of a court, which was plainly without jurisdiction to enter the judgment, simply because money had changed hands. I believe that such a result is antithetical to the principle that the power of a court to render a decision is fundamental. "Accordingly, I would not extend the concept of estoppel by remarriage to encompass the facts of this case, where the only benefit accepted is financial." |
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Steven Garmisa is the page one, daily columnist for the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, the leading legal newspaper in Illinois. Steve's column, Trial Notebook, is read by lawyers and judges throughout Illinois.
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